

COPYRIGHT WARNING

Notice: warning concerning copyright restrictions

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specific conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.

JACOB BURCKHARDT ON THE CONTEMPLATION OF HISTORY

Clyde C. Glandon
Spring, 1972
Episcopal Theological School

You wander above in the light
On tender ground, O holiest of spirits!
Glittering god-given breezes
Move you lightly,
As her fingers, the artist's,
Pluck holy strings.

Fateless, like a
Nursling, breathe those heavenly ones;
Chastely kept
In modest buds,
Their souls
Are ever-blooming,
And their blessed eyes
Gaze out so quietly
On clear eternity.

But we have the fortune,
Never to stay in one place,
We vanish, we topple
We, suffering mankind,
Blindly, from one
Hour to the next,
Tossed like water from one cliff
To yet another cliff,
Yearlong down to depths deep in doubt.

Hyperion's Song of Fate
Friedrich Hölderlin

From the perspective of twentieth-century experience of totalitarianism what has been most arresting in the figure of Jacob Burckhardt is his prophetic analysis of the modern state. In his Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, made up of lectures during the period of the unification of Germany, Burckhardt says Europe is living through a "great crisis in the idea of the State":

Political thought expects the State to be as mutable as its own caprices. At the same time, political thought claims for the State an ever-increasing and more comprehensive power of coercion...It should be able to do everything, yet allowed to do nothing. In particular, it must not defend its existing form in any crises--after all, what men want more than anything else is to retrieve their share of its exercise of power. Thus the form of the State is increasingly questionable and its radius of power increasingly great...The unity of the State's power and its mere area have become a cult. The more radically the sacred right of the State (its once arbitrary power over life and property) dies out, the more its secular rights expand.¹

It is perhaps easy enough to reduce Burckhardt's outraged pronouncements to the reaction of an arch-conservative dweller of patrician Basle, yet his warnings of "the coming age of barbarism" stubbornly retain their force in view of the events which make up Burckhardt's future and Europe's immediate past. In the context of twentieth-century German historical scholarship's re-evaluation of its national tradition of historical interpretation, the Swiss Burckhardt has received attention both for his troubled, prophetic insight and disdain for the

forces operative in the events and mentality of his contemporary world and for his alienation from the historical establishment represented by Heinrich von Treitschke. The development of the thought of Friedrich Meinecke, a student of Droysen's historical method some forty years after Burckhardt himself had attended Droysen's lectures in Berlin, most clearly reflects this twentieth-century appreciation of Burckhardt's convictions about the purpose and value of historical inquiry. Meinecke's pre-occupation with the philosophical and moral problems of the late-nineteenth-century "crises of historicism" led him to consider Burckhardt's importance in regard to historical understanding of the state. This may be seen in following Meinecke's thinking through such works as Jacob Burckhardt, die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung und der National Staat (1906), Weltburgertum und Nationalstaat (1908), Die Idee der Staatsraison in der Neueren Geschichte (1924), and Carl Neumann über Jacob Burckhardt (1928). In the years of the 1940's, after writing his Die Deutsche Katastrophe (1946), Meinecke says of Burckhardt:

For Burckhardt power in itself is evil, Böse an sich. That is Burckhardt's terrifyingly fundamental sentiment in considering the state as such and its significance for mankind...How typical is this difference between Ranke's bright-eyed trust that Europe would have a savior and Burckhardt's vision of the future, aware of its own blindness and yet with a quiet hope... Burckhardt saw more deeply and acutely into the essential historical character of his own time. As a result he was able to see the future, too, more definitely and more certainly than Ranke could.²

And truly there is a disturbing accuracy in Burckhardt's articulation of his fears, even when accounted for by their immediate contexts:

I feel deep down inside me that something is going to burst out in the West, once Russia has been reduced to confusion by acts of violence. That will be the beginning of the period when every stage of confusion will have to be gone through, until finally a real Power emerges based upon sheer, unlimited violence...(1881). You don't know what a tyranny is going to be exercised on the spirit...it will develop like a natural phenomenon, involving everything that is hellish in human nature (1846).³

Burckhardt's alarm, while most notable with reference to those issues of power and the state in history and with reference to the German historical establishment's treatment of these problems, extends through politics as such and reacts to changes in nineteenth-century society which have born fruit tasting equally as sour as the experience of the state in the twentieth century. Burckhardt's perception of "the essential historical character" of his age includes a disturbed observation of the development of technology in industry and war-making. He feels as if his historical work is "amateurish" when compared to "the high-purposefulness of the military machine worked out to the last details". Burckhardt predicts that the military machine will become the model for existence as "the machinery of State and administration is transformed and militarized." His now well-known suspicion, which he says sounds completely mad, is that

"the military state will have to turn industrialist": "The accumulation of beings, the mounds of men in the yards and factories cannot be left for all eternity in their need and thirst for riches; a planned and controlled degree of poverty, with promotion and uniforms, starting and ending daily to the roll of drums".⁴

Such are the more provocative projections which have been responsible for contemporary interest in this nineteenth-century historian of art and culture. During the time between Meinecke's essay of 1906 and his essay on Ranke and Burckhardt of 1948, the complete Burckhardt corpus became available in German. In 1906 Burckhardt's dramatic Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen had only recently been assembled by Burckhardt's nephew Jacob Oeri from lecture notes from Burckhardt's course at the University of Basle "Introduction to the Study of History" (1868-1869; 1870-1871) and from lectures held at the Museum of Basle in 1870 and 1871 entitled "The Great Men of History" and "On Fortune and Misfortune in History". Burckhardt had been, and has remained, significant for his major works, Die Zeit Konstantin der Grosse (1852) and his famous Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (1860; 2nd Ed., 1868; Ital. tr., 1876; Engl. tr., 1878). The works Cicerone (1855), Erinnerung aus Rubens, and Die Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien (or Geschichte der neueren Baukunst, vol. I, 1867) had early served

to establish Burckhardt's importance and influence as a highly original art historian. Here his more immediate influence was represented in his student Heinrich Wölfflin. Meinecke had read the Griechische Kulturgeschichte under the impression that Burckhardt had tossed it off in his later years, though half of it had been edited from lecture notes after his death. It was only in 1929 that Burckhardt's lecture notes from history courses during the period of 1865-1885 became the Historische Fragmente when the first work was begun on the fourteen-volume Jacob Burckhardt Gesamtausgabe by Albert Oeri, Emil Dürr, Felix Staehelin, Wölfflin, and Burckhardt's ambitious biographer Werner Kaegi. Collections of Burckhardt's letters to his friends Gottfried Kinkel, Heinrich Geymüller, Friedrich von Preen and the Schauenburg brothers had appeared by this time and have since been edited by Max Burckhardt (1949).⁵ It was during the period encompassed by the two world wars, especially in the 1940's, that Burckhardt scholarship expanded in volume and range of interest. Biographical interests, of Markwart (1920), Werner von der Schulenburg (1926) and Carl Neumann (1927), were crowned by Werner Kaegi's exhaustive four-volume biography (1947-1967) and have extended to interest in Nietzsche's relation to Burckhardt⁶, treatments of Burckhardt's religious thought⁷, and comparisons to such a multifarious group of individuals as Hegel, Eichendorff, Dahlmann, Weber, Hesse and Kafka.⁸

Our concern with Burckhardt's notion of the "contemplation" of history is thus a small part of extensive twentieth-century investigation of the man and his works. For our purposes we cannot hope to offer a critical assessment of Burckhardt's wide-ranging interpretations of the particulars of the history of western civilization, no more than we can attempt to examine Burckhardt's unique definitions and interpretations of the Renaissance and the period of the recognition of Christianity with reference to post-Burckhardt historiography of these "periods".⁹ Further dimensions of Burckhardt's importance, his relevance in the twentieth century as a prophet, his place as an historian and theorist of culture, and his response to the society of his own century, have been amply appreciated and studied in the last thirty years.¹⁰ Concern with these major parts of Burckhardt's comprehensiveness can at best contribute to our attempt to treat systematically a rather narrower range of considerations.

In this study it is our purpose to take up Burckhardt's thinking in his works and letters in regard to historical theory. Burckhardt's "way" of doing history, as it is exemplified in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, has been described as impressionistic and, according to Croce, productive not of the "story or drama and dialectic of action" but of a "picture, the description of a fixed and immobilized reality".¹¹ It is

tempting to see in Burckhardt's historical work the simple application of artistic taste to history in such a way that the events of history are not to be reconstructed, narrated, explained, or even known, but instead are merely media through which the spiritual reality of an epoch is contemplated and appreciated. For some, this is a function of Burckhardt's conservatism and escapism: perhaps Burckhardt himself could have influenced the future he was so concerned about had he been less contemplative and more active, had he taken Ranke's chair instead of merely wishing Treitschke well in his place.¹²

As is the case with Burckhardt's own comments about the contemplation of history his own description of himself may partly justify the accusation of escapism. During his twenties in the 1840's Burckhardt admits his increasing conservatism and takes note of the first time he was able to summon "the courage to be conservative and not to give in" in the face of the "wild, confused pursuit of freedom" which he saw everywhere around him.¹³ Later he comes to call himself the "arch diletante". He offers the simple justification that he "wants to help save things". "I want to discover the interest for which I am to perish, namely the old culture of Europe".¹⁴ He says his attitude is ironical, that he has "fallen out with this wretched age entirely" and "can do nothing more with society as a whole". He wants

to get away from them all, from the radicals,

the communists, the industrialists, the intellectuals, the pretentious, the reasoners, the abstract, the absolute, the philosophers, the sophists, the State fanatics, the idealists, the 'ists' and 'isms' of every kind.

He "who (is) so tired of the present age will be refreshed by the thrill of antiquity".¹⁵ Such attitudes on Burckhardt's part have also been referred to in moving beyond the explanation of Burckhardt's historical works per se to the assessment of Burckhardt as a speculative philosopher of history. Here Burckhardt's rejection of Hegel and Lesaulx, as well as his rejection of religious interpretations of history land him as a Mensch inmitten der Geschichte¹⁶ for whom his historical Anschauungen must bear the weight of religion and philosophy, making him the historicist¹⁷ par excellence. We are interested in the contents of Burckhardt's historical "outlook", especially since Burckhardt wishes carefully to distinguish history from philosophy and theology yet has an outlook which is philosophical and, perhaps, religious in what its vision touches upon. But it is important to note that our study entails neither the exclusive concern with Burckhardt as a speculative philosopher of history, in the sense of Karl Joel's examination of Burckhardt als Geschichtsphilosoph¹⁸, nor the exclusive concern with the historical method of Burckhardt as a practitioner of the science of history. In noting Meinecke's attention to Burckhardt we have suggested the question of the purpose and value of historical

work. It is this question, and the several questions that it actually asks, that will be the central topic in our examination of Burckhardt's thinking as an historian. The question of what a particular piece of historical investigation is "for", in the sense of "purpose" or "primary aim", is theoretical because it is in some sense a pre-historical question; as it asks about the "value" of the work it is theoretical because it is in some sense a post-historical concern. On the notorious scale which runs from objectivity to subjectivity in speaking of judgment, interpretation, explanation, and understanding in the discipline of history, the question of what history is for may be interpreted all the way from the "objective" question of what the discipline of history has as its unique activity or subject matter in relation to other disciplines to the "subjective" question of why the historian is interested or concerned at all. In the case of Burckhardt both questions are particularly relevant. I suggest that these questions, regardless of the order in which we answer them, are questions which lie irreducibly on the boundary between speculation about the intelligibility and significance of the events we call history and theoretical refinement of the science which reconstructs the events. It is our purpose to understand both the speculative and the methodological views of Burckhardt through reference to how he defines his discipline and its task and through reference to what we may

determine to be the sources of his views of the importance or significance of this task. With this end in view we shall proceed by taking some account of the circumstances of Burckhardt's life and intellectual development which contributed to his understanding of what historical study is for. Then, basing our analysis upon Burckhardt's description of history's task and value, we shall proceed to examine Burckhardt's notion of contemplation and his understanding of the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of the course of history.

I

Jacob Burckhardt's life, like Bismarck's, spanned the nineteenth century. He was born in May three years after the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna and lived most of his lonely life of teaching and study in his home city of Basle until his death in 1897. His career as Professor of History at the University of Basle began in 1858, after he had taught art history at the Zürich Polytechnique for three years, and was completed with his retirement from the chair of History in 1885 which provided that he retain the chair of Art History. The period in Burckhardt's life which is determinative for an understanding of the formation of his historical thinking, however, lies in the fifteen-year period which commences during his theological studies at Basle (1837-1839) and has its end in

a period of years after 1846. It is during this time, which witnessed the ousting of Strauss from Zürich, the Sonderbundkrieg of 1847 and the revolutions of 1848, that Burckhardt passed from the study of theology to his training in history under Ranke, Droysen, Boeckh, and Franz Kugler, and experienced the turns and changes in his thinking which framed his vocation and the distinctive qualities of his historical sense for the remainder of his scholarly life. Von Martin sees a "singular constancy" in Burckhardt's "religious ideas" since the time of Burckhardt's abandonment of theology.¹⁹ Stadelmann, Kaegi, and Nichols concur in identifying the years of 1846-1852 as the time of a "conversion" in Burckhardt's conception of Kunstgeschichte and Kulturgeschichte, in his attitudes towards the historical enterprise of his teacher Ranke, and in his turning to classicism and humanism as a new norm for his view of historical existence.²⁰ Following Von Martin's example²¹, we wish to provide in this section not a detailed biographical account of these years of Burckhardt's life but a description of Burckhardt during this time which displays the constituent parts of his mature reflection on history. Perhaps most obvious is Burckhardt's reaction, his fatalism and rejection of the goals and symbols of social and historical achievement which seemed to be presupposed in the history he saw taking place during the 1840's. This must be balanced by attention to Burckhardt's theological

studies and his decision that he could be no Christian minister, no theologian, and no believer in the historical mission of the Christendom he knew in Switzerland and the Germanies. Burckhardt's study of history at Berlin is the most direct source of his training in the craft of historical investigation and the basis from which he moves to his own conception of his task as historian. Finally, there is Burckhardt's classicism: all that replaced, or at least encompassed, Burckhardt's Christianity and provided such "quiet hope" as there was in Burckhardt's life and thought. Here we shall seek to locate what Markwart and Von Martin describe as "quasireligiöser Ersatz" in the aesthetics of Romantic Hellenism.

The fathers and sons of the various branches of the Burckhardt family had, during the centuries of their association with the environs of Basle, established a tradition of prominent professional livelihood and clerical service in the city. Burckhardt's father (1785-1858), as assistant (Obersthelfer) and then as Rector (Antistes) of the Reformed churches in Basle, emerged from the pietism of his family background as an outspoken conservative during the decades of the 1830's and 1840's which were so filled with the ecclesiastical controversies of the radicals, conservatives and Roman Catholics. Though he had warm feelings for the deeply-pietistic Jung-Stilling (1740-1817) during his years of study at Heidelberg (1807-1808), Burckhardt's

father was drawn towards a Christianity formed of Reformed orthodoxy under the influence of Phillip Marheinecke (1780-1846) and Karl Daub (1765-1836) and a strong commitment to serious historical and philological investigation under the influence of Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1858) and the young W.M.L. De Wette (1780-1849).²² The political and ecclesiastical conservatism of Burckhardt's family was a conservatism, in the words of James Hastings Nichols, "of the most aristocratic, the most self-contained city-state of nineteenth-century Europe." "A city with the sharpest social distinctions, of strict Calvinist orthodoxy, reserved toward outsiders, Basle could be compared in America only with Old Boston, or to save argument, what is said of Old Boston."²³ The ecclesiastical conservatives of Basle were men of the Reformed Church who staunchly resisted the rationalism of the Aufklärung which had become predominant in Geneva and Zürich in the eighteenth century and which continued among the clergy and theological faculties through the whole of the nineteenth century. Theirs was a pietist-flavored orthodoxy which was anti-rational in the same spirit of the post-1815 réveil or Erweckung yet which also opposed those elements of the réveil and a growing liberalism which favored trans-cantonal disestablishment and democratic ecclesiastical polity.

Jacob was in his early teens during the Kantonal-revolutionen which forced the aristocratic church-state

authorities to cede to a looser polity and began a period of increasing freedom for "free churches". He grew to maturity during a time of increasingly intense theological and ecclesiastical controversy in Switzerland which was complicated by the formation of the Roman Catholic Sonderbund in 1845 in an effort to assert Roman rights in a land having established Protestantism on the right and liberal anti-clericalism on the left. Burckhardt completed his study of the humanities and the classics in Gymnasium in the spring of 1836, spent the summer studying history and philosophy at the University of Basle, and studied French literature for nine months with Alexander Vinet before following his father's vocation in taking up theological studies at the University of Basle in the academic year 1837-1838. He emerged from his theological studies a political and ecclesiastical conservative without the benefit of a commitment to orthodox belief nor of a desire to engage in the politics of the ecclesiastical and theological controversies. His father's teacher, De Wette (at Basle since 1822), while not justifying the fears which led the conservatives to call the enthusiastic J.T. Beck to Basle to counteract what was feared to be the too-rational critical biblical scholarship of De Wette, was evidently just critical enough to unsettle Burckhardt's religious beliefs. Jacob relates that he finds himself in agreement with De Wette that the orthodox doctrine of Jesus' birth is a myth.²⁴

Looking back from 1878, he says that he "did not have the faith for the pulpit".²⁵ His letters of the time indicate his state of mind. He says he cannot look the ruins of his convictions in the face, offers that the orthodox have a comfortable time compared with being an honest heretic, and wonders whether there "is a department in the Theological Faculty where one can leave dogma and revelation on one side and study antiquity and languages."²⁶ The importance of Burckhardt's crisis of faith does not lie so much in a shattered vocation; Kaegi reminds us that Burckhardt did not enter theological studies as a theologian but as a philologist and historian and that it was his father's vocation, not his own, which took him to the study of theology.²⁷ Burckhardt says in 1839 that it is clear to him that he shall not "make theology, nor indeed find in it, (his) life's work." "With convictions such as mine (if I may so call them) I could never take a living with a clear conscience, not at any rate while the present views on revelation prevail--and they are unlikely to change very soon. Hence my final decision to become a teacher."²⁸ What is most important here is Burckhardt's fatalism in reaction to the politics of the theology of the time, unsustained as he was by the religious beliefs of the conservative faction, in the face of which a vision of the study of history promised to offer some satisfaction. Burckhardt's decision not to continue in his father's vocation was heavily balanced

by his observation of the course of events and what he could see--or did not want to see--in a future as a minister. While his ordained friends Johannes Riggenschach and Alois Biedermann were either supporting Strauss or embracing Hegel, Burckhardt feared the "real-life" consequences of the controversies. To his friend Willibad Beyschlag, who had also taken orders, Burckhardt suggests that while he can perhaps feel secure in the validity of his orders, he must "only take care...when it comes to practical life!"²⁹ The day after the outbreak of violence in reaction to the attempted appointment of Strauss to the faculty at Zürich, Burckhardt says that he is "once again reminded...how dangerous and sinful it would be, in times such as these, when the position of the Church is so unsettled, to dedicate one's life to theology without the clearest inner call."³⁰ In 1843 he thinks that things are headed for an "abyss" and "it will not be long before another explosion" and upon his return to Basle from Berlin in 1844 to take up the editorship of the Basler Zeitung for an eighteen-month period he was in a position to see the development of events which issued in the Sonderbundkrieg.

Burckhardt's thinking in these years displays his concern not for the details of either the theological and biblical controversies or of the political issues, but for a wider historical assessment of what is taking place. His

letter to Beyschlag in 1844 is particularly revelatory of the application of this historical eye to Christianity. Here Burckhardt has begun to speak of a period of disillusion and disintegration: "...from our point of view Christianity has entered upon the realm of purely human periods in history...".³¹ He could make no sense of theology and the repellent political crises which it seemed to foster could only convince him of the decline of Christian institutional existence. Burckhardt's experience of the erosion of the Church-State cantonal structures and the political life they had encompassed brought, as we have noted, his disillusionment with the whole web of social life, an historical amalgamation of institutions of which Christendom was but another sordid part. Burckhardt substituted a "world-estranged" humanism for what he felt to be a "world-befriended Christianity".³² His estrangement extended to his expatriating himself in 1846, so "disgusting and barbarous (were) conditions in Switzerland." Burckhardt sees only a "mobile anarchy" with Freedom and Liberalism as mere signs of the tyranny, slavery, and despotism of beasts.³³ He is convinced that it is no longer possible to "link up a real social organism" with aging Europe and feels that any genuine society has been precluded by 1789. For Burckhardt all Europe has had "the historical ground" pulled out from under its feet and the nineteenth-century "began with a complete tabula rasa in relation to everything."³⁴

There was a certain amount of immediate alarm in Burckhardt's words in 1846 when he said that he wanted to help save things. The statement is a direct rationale for Burckhardt's preoccupation with cultural history in response to what he thought would be the suffocation and decay of present culture "in the very dung of its own philistinism".³⁵ The consideration which is complementary to this a reactionary's definition of history as culture-saving is the parallel question of history's value for the former theological student's fatalism. In his letters to his sister after he began to study history in Berlin, Burckhardt attempts to reassure her of his belief in Providence, yet to Riggerbach he writes:

The end to which Providence has set before mankind is the conquest of selfishness and sacrifice of the individual for the sake of the universal. Hence a man's most necessary attribute is Resignation; each hour preaches abnegation, and our dearest wishes remain unfilled...Man grows old fighting his desires; his highest aim is to forgo his wishes lovingly, never to yield to misanthropy for a single moment, and to die at peace with the world. I would exchange my life against never having been, at any moment, and, were it possible, return to the womb.³⁶

Whether it was primarily the result of Burckhardt's loss of belief in traditional orthodoxy or in his retreat from the disturbing realities of Basle's experience of the forties, Burckhardt's sense of resignation remained part of his thinking about history throughout his life. On July 20, 1870, the day after the French declaration of war on Prussia, Burckhardt

remarks philosophically that "even in tolerable health and in fair circumstances, we live over an abyss".³⁷ At the beginning of his fruitful study of history in Berlin, he speaks for himself of the importance history is to have for his world-view:

I am overcome with shame as I write, and feel that I ought to keep silent for a long time. Had I but emerged from scepticism, in itself a great step, I could speak from my heart, as you have the right to do. At the same time there are other demons to overcome, and to put it in a word, complete worldliness in the manner of seeing and doing everything. One remedy against this I have found in my main subject, History, which was the first shock that unseated my fatalism and the view of life I had found upon it.³⁸

Four months later in March of 1840, Burckhardt has studied ancient history with Droysen and finds himself preoccupied with philosophy of history, though he is unable to understand the "post-Hegelians". His study of history has allowed him to re-interpret Providence in a much more positive vein and he writes to Friedrich von Tschudi that his poetry has come into "danger of being sent packing now that (he has) found the height of poetry in history".

There was a time when I looked upon the play of fantasy as the highest requirement of poetry; but since I must esteem the development of spiritual states, or, quite simply, inner states as such, higher still, I now find my satisfaction in history itself, which exhibits this development in two distinct phases running parallel, crossing and intermingling, and, indeed identical: I refer to the development of the individual and the development of the whole; add to that the brilliant

outward events of history--the gorgeous motley press of the world's progress, and I find myself back at the old, and much misunderstood saying that the Lord is the supreme poet. You may reply that poetry is not just the development of inner states, but their beautiful development, according to laws of harmony which are ideally performed in man's poetical mind; That I allow, thus granting poetry a sufficiently wide field; but to me it is far from having the attraction which it possessed while I still ignored the incomparably greater Guidance of the world's progress.³⁹

This letter provides an especially useful insight into the distinctive character of Burckhardt's historical thinking. Burckhardt's use of the comparison to poetry is particularly important. It indicates the important modification which Burckhardt later gives to the progressive and developmental theories of historical idealism which are so apparent in his thinking at this time. The presence of the poetic motif also indicates the two poles between which Burckhardt's view of historical existence swings. Such positive views of historical existence which he is able to summon through historical contemplation presuppose throughout the fatalism of his last year as a theology student. In the lecture "On Fortune and Misfortune in History", about which Burckhardt says he seeks to "conclude as comfortably as possible so as to reconcile people to fate,"⁴⁰ the terms "higher necessity" and "world economy" are difficult to identify with divine providence: Burckhardt's principle of compensation is much closer to a Heracleitan view of Dike so far as the events of the material

world are concerned. The "quiet hope" in Burckhardt's contemplation of history is a function of that aspect of Plato's doctrine of the good which allows "an optimistic faith in the control of the world's temporal course by a benevolent providence"⁴¹ and an embracing of the world in activity: the ever-present and heavy balance in Burckhardt's contemplation is the interpretation of Plato which, as we have seen in Burckhardt's abiding disdain for nineteenth-century society, values the otherworldly vision of poetry and art and devalues the res gestae of men as such and the opinions and illusions which govern them. The conditions which Burckhardt places upon any hope are these:

...if in misfortune there is to be some fortune as well, it can only be a spiritual one, facing backward to the rescue of the culture of earlier times, facing forward to the serene and unwearied representation of the spirit in a time which could otherwise be given up entirely to things mundane.⁴²

For Burckhardt as one who is concerned for the fate of the culture of old Europe in the hands of nineteenth-century "boors" and "village magnates" the vocation of the historian is a salvaging enterprise. For Burckhardt as one who is familiar with the suspicion that an amoral fate lies behind the wearisome events of the world, an historical understanding can perhaps provide some hope, provided that the object and means of this understanding are rather highly qualified. The questions which remain are what the character of the "Guidance" is and

how it is known in history. Is the historian to divine the purpose of the world economy and identify with it in acting in his own time or is he to collect and contemplate its scattered gifts with appreciation but in ignorance of its design?

The century which preceded Burckhardt's study of his new subject at Berlin had born the bloom of German culture. Behind Burckhardt's teachers at Berlin, Ranke, Droysen, Boecke, Kugler, Grimm, and the students of Savigny, were the giants of German idealism, romanticism and historical scholarship. Burckhardt's thinking is solidly established within this rich tradition of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; Herder, Goethe, Schiller, the Schlegels, and the early W. von Humboldt; Justus Moser, Johann Winckelmann, B. G. Niebuhr and Friedrich August Wolf. Burckhardt's historical works, as is the case with the histories and the historiographical contributions of Ranke and Droysen, are a mark of the expansion of philological and historical investigation of ancient Greek and Roman culture as well as a definite product of several decades of renewed interest in the world of medieval Christendom and the roots of the puzzling phenomenon of "modern" European political and social existence. His thinking about the discipline of history takes part in 1) the commitment to the idea of a metaphysical reality behind the events and institutions of human history, with its defining roots in Spinoza and Leibnitz, 2) the tradition of cosmopolitan tolerance for and interest in

the whole plenitude and diversity of the manifestations of humanity in history, with its attendant notion of Universalgeschichte, and 3) the long process of grappling with the implications of this commitment and this tradition for the question of value judgments in history, for the question of the legitimacy or world-historical sanction of the spirit and values which lay behind present use of tradition in social, political and national order, for the question of how the spirit moves, is made accessible, and is known in history, and for the peculiar questions which are thus posed for the enterprise of historical inquiry. Our interest here is in the particular forms of historical idealism, the particular forms of the romantic ideal of totality and sensitivity to Bartlichkeit, and the particular questions implied in these wider phenomena which Burckhardt inherited through his exposure to the traditions of historical thought and their controversies during his study at Berlin. This provides a means of marking off the modifications which Burckhardt gives them in his understanding of what history's task is as it is displayed in his Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen; his letters, and the lectures which make up the Historische Fragmente.

A constellation of challenges for historical thought is apparent in the milieu in which Burckhardt found himself at Berlin. The controversy between Ranke and the Hegelian Heinrich

Leo presents a cross-section of the stage of development of these challenges at this time. Both the Hegelians and the group of historians representing the historical school at Berlin assumed the existence of a spiritual reality in or behind history as well as the view that attention to history is the "way" to come to terms with the ultimate conditions and problems of human existence. The lines were drawn, however, with reference to a particular set of considerations. How to evaluate the particulars of history, for example, shall Machiavelli be judged strictly with reference to the world of his time or from the point of view of his world-historical significance, and how to delineate the roles of the discipline of history and the enterprise of philosophy in understanding the relation of particulars in history to general truths? Ranke's position reveals an attempt to remain true to Herder's principle of evaluating every age on its own terms and to restrict the search for the general truths which are there to be grasped in history to the science which methodically reconstructs the particulars. Ranke is in principle opposed to the imposition of schema upon the course of history and its subsumption under a general concept.⁴³ The norm which Ranke had offered to limit the historical enterprise to the sole task of establishing what actually happened denies four types of presentism: 1) The present usefulness of knowledge of the

past, its didactic value, as in Bolingbroke or Polybius;

2) The applicability or appropriateness of employing present moral and ethical standards to past behavior; 3) The applicability of present (or any present's) "a priori ideas" or "universal concepts" to the variety of history's particulars; and, 4) The presentism of a theory which maintains that the significance of past personalities, events and eras lies in their teleological purpose, a final cause which is identical with the present moment in history. The "facts" however are not value-neutral on Ranke's terms. For Ranke the discipline of history "at its highest" has as its goal the lifting of "itself in its own fashion from the investigation and observation of particulars to a universal view of events, to a knowledge of the objectively existing relatedness."⁴⁴ The particulars of history are expressive of a spiritual value and are understood not through the observation of external causality but through the "understanding" of their internal relatedness. The data of the past may be made significant for us through the historian's Verstehen of the general truths which the particular manifests. Herder, von Humboldt and Ranke are skeptical of the notion of the past being "for our sake" and are skeptical of man's ability to determine the purpose either of providence or of the movements of the spirit. This provides the basis both for Burckhardt's refusal to discuss origins and ends where there is only flux

and for Burckhardt's attention to what is relatively constant and stable in history. The concrete manifestations of the spiritual, whether through the concepts of Individualität, Totalität, Einheit, or the "slender thread" midst the diversity of the Humanitätsideal, provide the sole media of history's intelligibility. This mentality of "what for our sake" and "us for what's sake", however, combined with the idealistic interpretation of historical phenomena, surfaces in Ranke's thought with a twist which has unfortunate results for Herder's cosmopolitanism. In discussing Universalgeschichte, Ranke concludes that das Volk must be the focus of attention. From the discussion of the history of peoples Ranke moves to the contention that "no state has ever subsisted without a spiritual basis and a spiritual substance." "In power itself there appears a spiritual substance, an original genius, which has a life of its own, fulfills conditions more or less peculiar to itself, and creates for itself its own domain."⁴⁵ Optimism in regard to the whole, the whole for which there is no one absolute human system of interpretation and no encompassing philosophy, is contingent upon a belief that "Providence guides the path of development"⁴⁶ (Herder), belief in "a divine cosmic plan"⁴⁷ (von Humboldt), or faith in the "religious source" of what men do in history, in an "eternal element coming from God"⁴⁸ (Ranke). The points of importance for the consideration

of Burckhardt are his version of the Verstehen by which the historian has access to anything beyond the flux of events, his response to the nationalization of Herder's cosmopolitanism after the Napoleonic experience and in which Volksindividualität and the spirit-sanctioned power of its historical institutions come to be the central categories of historical self-understanding, and his lack of the same basis for optimism about the meaning of the whole. His struggles with Überpartlichkeit will show an interesting combination of an intensified attack upon the forms of presentism, a dissatisfied denial of objectivity on Ranke's terms, the striving in principle for an "Archimedean point outside events", and the adoption of a positive norm in classicism.

Droysen left for Kiel after Burckhardt's first year at Berlin. Burckhardt's letters and class notes display his enthusiastic response to what he had heard in Droysen's lectures. He notes that "history is man's memory of himself" and affirms the enterprise of examining the works of the spirit in history.⁴⁹ Droysen represents a direct encounter for Burckhardt with the application of Hegelian philosophy of history to the course of events in western civilization. Burckhardt's letter of March, 1840 reflects Droysen's interpretation of history as a spiritual progression and indicates its value at this time for Burckhardt's struggle with the problem of fate. It is from

Ranke, however, that Burckhardt comes into possession of a view of the spirit's relation to history which plays a more positive and abiding role in Burckhardt's thinking. Ranke consistently relies on God's providence to provide belief in the meaning of the whole of history rather than conceiving of the issue in terms of the purpose and the development of the world-spirit. For purposes of finding provisional meanings in history, given a faith in providence and a refusal to acknowledge speculation's role in grasping its purpose, Ranke offers the idea of continuity, the idea of the spiritual unity of humanity in history, and the notion of Volksindividualität as threads of meaning which may be seen running through the multiplicity of details in history. Burckhardt's enduring conception of Europe, "not as western Christendom nor as an Empire, but as a destiny-fostered family of free peoples with the treasure of a common memory"⁵⁰ is traceable to Ranke's mission to know through the study of history the essential unity of human history. Burckhardt moves beyond allegiance to the notion of Volksindividualität, but at this point in his studies there is a positive appropriation of Ranke's thinking similar to the optimism displayed in his response to Droysen. In response to news of a renewed controversy in Switzerland over religious orders in September of 1841, Burckhardt speaks to his sister of not giving up his country, but of devoting

himself to its history. Swiss history is here interpreted as part of the history of German culture and the "remedy against the threatening decline of a people...is...to renew its links with its origins"⁵¹. Burckhardt praises Germany for its culture and learning and says it is to Germany's "holy land" that he owes so much for everything.⁵² His thinking about the study of history has also been balanced by his friendly and productive relationship with the art historian Franz Kugler. Burckhardt acquired Ranke's hostility to the philosophy of history along with the aspiration to the encompassing view of universal history. Kugler's lectures on the general history of architecture, from which Burckhardt notes that the history of art may reveal in its forms both ideas and the ideal, mark a point in Burckhardt's vocation of being "drawn like a magnet to art history"⁵³ as well as indicate the degree to which Burckhardt's choice of which particulars to study historically influences his Rankean conceptions of history's task and method of intuiting the spiritual. The day after Burckhardt calls Schelling a gnostic and accuses him of offering a "frightful, half-nonsensical, intuitionist, contemplational form of expression"⁵⁴, he proceeds to describe to Beyschlag his own theory of historical contemplation. In this letter and in a letter to Karl Fresenius shortly afterwards, Burckhardt's use of the ideas of his teachers finds expression in his own

growing conception of himself as an historian:

You must long ago have recognized the onesided bent of my nature towards contemplation. My whole life long I have never yet thought philosophically, and never had any thought at all that was not connected with something external. I can do nothing unless I start out from contemplation. And of course I include spiritual contemplation, e.g., historical contemplation, issues from the impression we receive from the sources. What I build up historically is not the result of criticism and Speculation, but on the contrary, of imagination, which fills up the lacunae of contemplation. History to me is always poetry for the greater part; a series of the most beautiful artistic compositions. Accordingly I simply don't believe in an a priori standpoint; that is a matter for the World Spirit, not for the man of history...My historical work will perhaps become readable in time, agreeable even, but where there is no inner picture to be set down on paper it is bound to be insolvent...My entire historical work, like my passion for travel, my mania for natural scenery and my interest in art, springs from an enormous thirst for contemplation.⁵⁵

His letter to Fresenius is his most complete and most personal statement of the relative values of history and philosophical speculation for understanding historical existence:

Although you are a philosopher, you must allow me the truth of the following: A man like me, who is altogether incapable of speculation, and who does not apply himself to abstract thought for a single minute in the whole year, does best to try and clarify the most important questions of his life and studies in the way that comes naturally to him. My surrogate is contemplation, daily clearer and directed more and more upon essentials. I cling by nature to the concrete, to visible nature, and to history. But as a result of drawing ceaseless analogies between facta...I have succeeded in abstracting much that is universal. Above this manifold universe there hovers, I know, a still higher universal, and perhaps I shall be able to mount that step too one day. You would not believe how, little by little, as

a result of this possibly one-sided effort, the facta of history, works of art, the monuments of all ages gradually acquire significance as witnesses to a past stage in the development of the spirit. Believe me, when I see the present lying quite clearly in the past, I feel moved by a shudder of profound respect. The highest conception of the history of mankind; the development of the spirit to freedom, has become my leading conviction,...

Another man's speculations could never satisfy me, and still less help me, even if I were able to adopt them. I shall be influenced by them as by the spirit prevailing in the air of the nineteenth century; I shall even perhaps be unconsciously led by certain tendencies in modern philosophy. Leave me to experience and feel history on this lower level instead of understanding it from the standpoint of first principles. There will always be odd fish like me about. The unending riches that stream in upon me through the lower medium of immediate feeling are already making me happy beyond measure...

You see, I respect speculation as in every epoch one of the highest expressions of the spirit; only instead of Speculation itself, I am looking for its correlative in history...To me history is poetry on the grandest scale; don't misunderstand me, I do not regard it romantically or fantastically, all of which is quite worthless, but as a wonderful process of chrysalis-like transformations, of ever new disclosures and revelations of the spirit...You philosophers go further, your system penetrates into the depths of the secrets of the world, and to you history is source of knowledge, a science, because you see, or think you see, the primum agens where I only see mystery and poetry...Think of me as an artist, learning and aspiring--for I too live on images and contemplation--and then think of the melancholy that from time to time comes over artists, simply because they cannot give form to what has awakened within them.⁵⁶

We have noted a duality in Burckhardt between fatalism and hopefulness wherein good fortune in history is limited to

spiritual fortune. Burckhardt's "spiritualizing" of history clearly occupies a place in a wide tradition of German historical idealism. At least one way of drawing distinctions between doctrines of spirituality lies in a difference between the concepts of transcendence and immanence. Hegel's absolute idea perhaps encompasses them both. Ranke at least sees the material events of history as salvagable and meaningful through reference to their internal unity within an historical whole. Burckhardt's worldview, like his contemplative nature, is "one-sided" toward transcendence. His "development of the spirit to freedom" is a development of spiritual freedom and not a development of social, political or economic freedom in the human world. This does not mean, as he says, speculation about the transcendent, but a thirst for the transcendent which is imperfectly slaked through contemplation of particulars. If the particulars do not happen to be works of art then they too are "aestheticized". Burckhardt's four or five year period of viewing Kulturgeschichte as a means to understand and re-establish the unity of a particular cultural entity in his project of "renewing its links with its origins" or advancing "the German spirit"⁵⁷ was decisively cut short when he escaped everything and traveled to Italy in 1846. Burckhardt's tiredness of the present points to a distinct absence of conviction in the idea that the spiritual value of contemporary history was

preserved in German political institutions. By 1852 Burckhardt's conversion was complete. He relates to Paul Heyse that his view of art has for "some time now" undergone a "complete metamorphosis", that "the scales are falling from (his) eyes" and that "in the end" he has become one-sided. He says:

It is high time for me to free myself from the generally accepted bogus-objective recognition of the value of everything, whatever it may be, and to become thoroughly intolerant. Where history is concerned I still keep a safety-valve open. But there is also a word to be said on historical research and the way it is carried on and I am gradually acquiring the right to say it.⁵⁸

Kaegi offers that the "safety-valve" is important to note. Burckhardt "preserves the romantic principle in his realm of values in his actual histories." Yet, on Kaegi's account, "this change in Burckhardt's life cannot be taken seriously enough."

It is not only a turning away from Germany to Italy but also a renunciation of the historical pantheism of his youth for the search for a new norm...a renunciation of Ranke...the change to the classical Burckhardt and to his humanism...It is at the same time the change to a history of culture in a higher, worthier sense, which renders culture's ultimate heights and seeks the decisive values for mankind. For Burckhardt in his maturity, these crucial values can no longer lie in Volksindividualität and State and, above all, not in the political as such.⁵⁹

Burckhardt never loses the romantic appreciation of the culture of the middle ages. It is with reference to the

middle ages that Burckhardt is strongest in his reaction to presentism and the Enlightenment. His Gräechische Kulturgeschichte is the only work which treats directly the historical era from which he draws his life-long aesthetical norms and standards for human existence in history. Kaegi sees Burckhardt's life after the completion of The Civilization of Renaissance in Italy "governed by a constellation in which the star of Clio has won an ever stronger power and in which the shine of the classical planets tips the scale ever more powerfully".⁶⁰

Burckhardt's species of romantic Hellenism is in the genus represented by August Graf von Platen. Burckhardt certainly has no identification with the primitivism or social and political implications of Rousseau's thinking. His flight to Italy represents his alienation from all forms of nationalism and from all revolutionary ideals--romantic or otherwise. He denounces Schelling and has only disdain for the extremes of romantic feeling and introspective brooding. To a student who suspects himself of demon-possession, Burckhardt advises: "If you knew the terrible clefts and cracks that run through our subterranean life, you would sooner unlock all the treasures of love and devotion today...(it is) the only way to walk boldly and confidently over the abyss."⁶¹

In his letters to this student in 1855 and 1856 Burckhardt presents a sustained appeal to a love of classic beauty and clarity over pre-occupation with

Faust figures and that which is "decaying, and shines phosphorescently". His reaction to the "ultra-Byronesque Faust character" is to say that such a figure would be an "odious individual", "a sneering ne'er do well", "altogether lacking in the genuine love of things." Such "tremendously interesting, melancholy-skeptical, mysterious beings à la Byron...have never existed anywhere...possess no poetic truth whatsoever...(and) are no longer interesting."⁶² Elsewhere Burckhardt advises "saving oneself from the seas of feeling and reaching art, simplicity, truth." "Suffering and excitement...pain, anger, inner misery (and) revenge" must be "transformed into sheer beauty". The life-span of human beings must be fully used to attain harmony.⁶³ To Kaegi's constellation of history and classicism must be added the light of poetry which shines so clearly in Burckhardt's description of his activity as an historian. "At all times Burckhardt's life moved between history and poetry."⁶⁴ Indeed, in Burckhardt's classicism the poet and the historian share the same vocation. The activity of the historian itself, as speculation's correlative, frequently appears as subordinate to poetry. Poetry's mode of knowing as well as its aim seem to be the model for Burckhardt's definition of history's purpose and value. Burckhardt was no painter or sculptor and his sketches present the viewer with former man's spirituality in his architectural achievements.

Behind Burckhardt's definitions of the activity of the historian in his lectures and in his selection of the data which is included in his histories is the vocation as artist to recreate and present to the reader a glimpse of those particulars which are so worthy of contemporary man's contemplation and which have served for the author as media through which to view the realms which poetry and the visual arts grasp more perfectly. When the course of history itself is seen as poetry it is the historian, not the poet or painter, who must present such reality.

II

Burckhardt's letter to Hermann Schauenburg in 1846 in which he says he will escape to be "refreshed by the thrill of antiquity as by some wonderful peaceful tomb" so that he might "strike up new relations with life and poetry" provides the starting point for the consideration of Burckhardt's understanding of the purpose and value of the study of history. His search for the "old culture of Europe" does not have for its end any pragmatic value for the cultural renewal of Switzerland or the Germanies but instead has its origin in a vocation to contribute to a higher spiritual continuity. His "highest conception" of history as the "development of the spirit to freedom" is a conception which functions not as a handmaiden for activity in contemporary

history but as a basis for hope in a future that will be spiritually fortunate. It is this orientation which determines the definition of history in Burckhardt's lectures in the courses on the introduction to the study of history in 1868-1869 and 1870-1871.

The "Introduction" which appears in the Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen is preoccupied with preserving a separation between knowledge as such and any particular purpose which the historian may bring from his present to the study of the past. Burckhardt's retention of the "romantic principle" of setting forth the past for its own sake as well as his inheritance of the spirit of Ranke's objectivity find expression in this introduction in the sustained attention given to those "world forces" and "purposes" which would "interpret and exploit history for their own end" and which constitute "dangers which threaten knowledge".⁶⁵ Along with speculative philosophy of history and religious interpretations of history Burckhardt includes "socialism...with its history of the masses"⁶⁶ as approaches to history which represent unwarrantable purposes. Burckhardt will make "no attempt at a system...", claims "no...historical principles", and says history on his terms will have "nothing to do with the philosophy of history" a la Hegel. Philosophy of history is a "centaur...a contradiction in terms....since history coordinates and hence is unphilosophical and since philosophy subordinates and hence

is unhistorical." Philosophy, he says, "deals direct with the great riddle of life, above history, which pursues that goal imperfectly and indirectly".⁶⁷ History for Burckhardt can produce no system, must not subordinate its subject matter to preconceptions and cannot deal direct with the enigma of life by second-guessing the purpose of the world economy. "We are not privy to the purposes of eternal wisdom, they are beyond our ken... we cannot fathom the economy of world history...historical compensation is only a continuance of the life of wounded humanity with its center of gravity shifted."⁶⁸ The fallacies of such attempts are manifest. A philosophy of history which proceeds chronologically and seeks to "elicit a general scheme of development...in a highly optimistic sense...is merely the history of civilizations" which, if it proposes any "world plan", is "colored by preconceived ideas".⁶⁹ Burckhardt's objection, beyond the criticism in principle of preconceptions, is directed at the content of those a priori ideas, the claim of a teleological development towards the present, and the evaluation of the present and the optimism for the future it engenders. He characterizes Hegel as having contended that reason is a "given", "that the world is rationally ordered: hence the history of the world is a rational process, and the conclusion yielded by world history must (sic!) be that it was the rational, inevitable march of the world spirit".⁷⁰ This is a theodicy which begins to imply,

with its notions of "man becoming aware of his own significance" and that "all men are free", a doctrine of perfectibility and progress.⁷¹ Besides an historical agnosticism with regard to the purpose of world history, Burckhardt offers a broadside against the doctrines of perfectibility, progress and inevitability. During the years of these lectures Burckhardt has expressed himself clearly on these accounts:

The great harm was begun in the last century, mainly through Rousseau, with this doctrine of the goodness of human nature. Out of this plebs and educated alike distilled the doctrine of the golden age that was to come quite infallibly, provided people were left alone. The result, as every child knows, was the complete disintegration of the idea of authority in the heads of mortals, whereupon we periodically fall victim to sheer power. In the meanwhile, the idea of the natural goodness of man had turned, among the intelligent strata of Europe, into the idea of progress, i.e., undisturbed money-making and modern comforts with philanthropy thrown in as a sop to conscience... (The) only conceivable salvation would be for this insane optimism, in great and small, to disappear from people's brains. Present day Christianity is not equal to the task; it has gone in for and got mixed up with optimism for the last two hundred years.⁷²

Burckhardt counters that history simply cannot presuppose such beliefs:

Evil is assuredly a part of the great economy of world history... in the last resort, the impulse to great periodical changes is rooted in human nature... the only lesson to be drawn from an evil deed successfully perpetrated by the stronger party is not to set a higher value on earthly life than it deserves...⁷³

Here we are reminded of Burckhardt's lasting fatalism. His

offering of his views on fortune and misfortune is given, as we have noted, to reconcile people to fate, "to safeguard our impartiality against wishful thinking."⁷⁴ In discussing the crisis of history and the "radiant vision of the future" which drives "vast classes of people on a gigantic scale", Burckhardt says that the "curtain rises on the brilliant farce of hope."⁷⁵ History must rid itself of optimism and it must understand that there "never were, nor never will be any happy golden ages in a fanciful sense..." so must it "remain free from the foolish overvaluating of some past (and) from senseless despair of the present or fatuous hope for the future..."⁷⁶ Burckhardt maintains that such thinking, if it relies on a teleology, is fallacious to the historian. The historian is not allowed to see his "time as the consummation of all time" as if the "past is fulfilled in us". The past is not to be seen as a "contrast to and preliminary state of our time as the full development."⁷⁷ The developmental model is "shallow and inadequate":

Assigning a raison d'etre of everything as an evolutionary state is a lack of judgement...not everything is necessary by any means...Also the worst judgement is easily substituted for the supposed absence of judgment, namely, the approval of the fait accompli, the succes...The ordinary value judgement in history is in the habit of demanding immediate and complete victory of one element...⁷⁸

This is simply not so, for the multiplicity in history is too great. Arguing from the principle that the historian "should

be capable from time to time of turning completely away from purpose to knowledge simply because it is knowledge"⁷⁹ Burckhardt identifies in the "thickset hedge of purposeful interpretations which pass themselves off as records"⁸⁰ a whole range of rationales for the study of history which the historian must avoid. He counsels Bernhard Kugler to refrain from trying to sustain an historical theme by the mere "interest of the moment". "...Ought not History and Philosophy and one or two other beautiful things to assert themselves as being among the few dry rocks that the flood of time and the age cannot touch, because they offer knowledge as such an asylum?"⁸¹ So that history might not become mere journalism Burckhardt identifies the self of the present as the greatest of obstacles. Bias, which is "particularly prone to make its appearance in the guise of patriotism", becomes the chief rival of true knowledge if the historian's preoccupation is with the history of his own country. The study of national history is inevitably interwoven with "desires and fears". "Any greater intelligibility is merely apparent...an optical illusion...Patriotism...may be no more than a kind of partisanship within our own national circle; indeed, it often consists simply in causing pain to others."⁸² In the lecture on fortune and misfortune in history Burckhardt demolishes what he considers to be the pervasive standards for a wrongheaded attempt to judge good or bad fortune in history.

Our standards have only subjective values for ourselves. They have their sources, in Burckhardt's view, in our impatience with the tedious in history, our personal taste, our political sympathies, our subjective criteria for greatness in history, our praise of security and happiness, our egoism, and our definitions of culture. The judgment according to culture "consists in appraising the felicity and morality of a people or a state of life in the past by the diffusion of education, of general culture and comfort in the modern sense." Here Burckhardt shows a more specific implication of the doctrine of progress for historical judgment. With nineteenth-century standards of culture "nothing stands the test and all past ages are disposed of with more or less commiseration."⁸³ Yet, if history is not to be undertaken for the purpose of establishing a system, or for the sake of some present cause, or for the sake of charting the "inevitable" course of events which lead to the present, or for edifying one's patriotism, or for the moral and cultural judgment of the past, Burckhardt rounds off his restrictions by advising that neither should history be studied as a pastime, or out of boredom, or for the sake of pure enjoyment.

"We must always be on guard against taking our historical perspectives for the decrees of history." In Burckhardt's itemization of the numerous purposes for which history may not

be justifiably studied it would seem that he means to imply that there is some positive purpose which is somehow objectively warranted. Burckhardt does have a positive purpose in studying history, both as he sets it forth in his semi-theoretical Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen and as he pursues it in his work as an historian, yet what is of importance in Burckhardt as an historian and as a philosopher of history is his contention that there is no objective warrant for his purpose. Burckhardt occupies several positions at once. He rejects the "bogus-objective recognition of the value of everything" because he observes that it is not possible: "Actually, we ought to live constantly in the intuition of the world as a whole. But this would require a superhuman intelligence that would be above temporal succession and spatial limitation, and yet in constant contemplative communion with it, and on top of that, in sympathy with it."⁸⁴ Thus, Partlichkeit is, in this case, a consequence of the fact that man is not a "fateless spirit" but is in the midst of history. Burckhardt however, with his eyes on an Archimedean point outside events rejects a variety of the particular manifestations of Partlichkeit which he sees around him. Speculations about the structure, movement, and direction of history cannot do justice to the multiplicity of detail nor are speculative conclusions with regard to moral and intellectual progress, optimism, evil, and expectations for the future

instantiated on Burckhardt's account, by reference to the particulars of history. Speculations instead, are themselves historical phenomena to be studied. In his life Burckhardt attempts to detach himself from all politics and society and thus divest himself of the purposes, criteria and values of national and historical vested interests. In his theory he holds the vision of the whole above all historical enterprises and conclusions which are warped by those purposes and intentions which, whether they are aware of it or not, are governed by the present history they choose to embrace and participate in, and criticizes them with reference to his own perspective. In his works he chooses, arbitrarily he admits, to study those particulars which are expressive of what he has also chosen as the crucial values for mankind. His appeal is no more objective, his methods certainly seem more subjective, his presuppositions about the stuff of which history is made is perhaps equally unproved by the particulars themselves, and his position is clearly not politically-neutral, yet the differences between Burckhardt's viewpoint and those around him constitute the marks of his contribution.

Burckhardt describes history as "the record of what one age finds worthy of note in another".⁸⁵ It employs a criterion for what is worth communicating according to nationality, subjectivity, training, and period of the historian. The

historian is unable to rid himself of the views of his time and personality. "The clearest proof of it is this: As soon as history approaches our century and our worthy selves we find everything more 'interesting'; in actual fact it is we who are more 'interested'".⁸⁶ "Limitation is necessary and selection and detaching is arbitrary."⁸⁷ In Part One of The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy where Burckhardt presents the state as a work of art he explains that "to each eye the outlines of a given civilization probably present a different picture... individual judgment and feeling of both writer and reader must come into play at every moment."⁸⁸ Out of his conception of the task of history Burckhardt concludes that "no method is universally valid."

Every individual approaches this huge theme of contemplation in his own way, which may be his spiritual way through life: he may then shape his method as that way leads him...Of all scholarly disciplines history is the most unscientific, because it possesses or can possess least of all an assured, approved method of selection; that is, critical research has a very definite method, but the presentation of it has not...Our historical pictures are, for the most part, pure constructions... mere reflections of ourselves.⁸⁹

Burckhardt's definition of the "great general task of the historian" corresponds to both his radical criticism of speculative philosophies of history and purposeful historical studies and his radically subjective view of how that task is accomplished. History's work presupposes that both Geist and matter are mutable

in time; the forms which are the "vesture" of spiritual and material life are subject to change and destruction. The spiritual has an "historical aspect" which appears and is always perceived as changing, contingent and passing yet which forms, in all of its moments, a "vast whole beyond our power to divine". Every "event" also has a "spiritual aspect" which is the condition by which the event "partakes of immortality". The discipline which corresponds to this conception of reality has for its task as a whole the presentation of these "twin aspects, which are distinct, yet identical." Since the grasping of the whole by coming into possession of knowledge of its purpose or end is precluded, Burckhardt's metaphor is not one of linear development but instead the relationship of the parts to the whole is conceived through a spatial metaphor: "We should like to conceive a vast spiritual map on the projection of an immense ethnography, embracing both the material and the spiritual world and striving to do justice to all races, peoples, manner and religions together." Burckhardt's peculiar modification of the tradition of the spiritualizing of power leads him to identify power as the central phenomenon of history yet restricts him from baptizing power with spiritual or moral sanction. Without being able to know which manifestations of power are on the spirit's world-historical bandwagon Burckhardt, as "the contemporary individual (who) feels utterly helpless (when)

faced with historical forces of such a kind" refuses to act in history and attempts to "attain an Archimedean point outside events" and to "overcome in the spirit". Both the objects of speculation and the "amelioration" of religion lie beyond the historian's middle world of the present "where beginnings and end are all unknown" and where all is in constant flux. It is impossible to discern the whole and difficult to see the spiritual aspect and immortal character of the events of present history. The closest thing to an Archimedean point outside the events of present history is the relative detachment which is possible for the person looking back to events which do not affect him so immediately. This is the spiritual freedom which Burckhardt has spoken of. Those who are able to overcome in the spirit in this way "can hardly restrain a rueful feeling as they look back on all the rest, whom they have had to leave in bondage." "Not until much later can the mind soar in perfect freedom over such a past". And what he looks back to is not the painfulness of change itself, but, as Croce has hinted about Burckhardt, to the colorful skein which the spirit has left in its wake. With the past as a spiritual continuum resting as the object of the historian's attention Burckhardt's method is one of the poet and the artist: "While, as men of a definite epoch, we must inevitably pay our passive tribute to historical life, we must at the same time approach it in a spirit of

contemplation."⁹⁰ In the study of history, wherein the past, as object, is at midpoint between the blurred objects of the present and eternally unmoving reality, the historian himself is enabled, through attempting to empty himself of preoccupations of the present, to attain a midpoint between embodied opinions and an eternally serene gaze.

As Burckhardt states it history is a present-conditioned discipline which has the presentation of the "twin aspects" of the past as its activity and which has knowledge as such as its goal. The substance of this definition lies in the specification of what the object of this knowledge is and the corresponding values assigned to this knowledge beyond the value of knowledge for its own sake. The single influence of the historian's present which Burckhardt acknowledges as a positive impetus to the study of history is the present experience of the enigma of life in the flux of history. Burckhardt states that history approaches "the great and grievous riddle of life" indirectly and if the dangers which he has itemized as manifestations of "personal and temporal foreboding" can be avoided for a "calmer consideration from a greater distance" historical study "may yield a first hint of the nature of life on earth (and) help us to solve an infinitesimal part" of the enigma."⁹¹ Indeed it can offer a "way through life". Mind, says Burckhardt, "is the power of interpreting all things in an ideal sense". The

historical mind, instead of remembering a pre-embodied vision of the ideal, must transmute the "remembrance of its passage through the ages of the world" into a possession.

What was once joy and sorrow must now become knowledge, as it must in the life of the individual...Our intellect...is ever renewed and consecrated by the consciousness of its own connection with the mind of the remotest times and civilizations...It gets to know itself and value its lofty nature only through comparison with that which it, the eternally unchanging, has been in all times...We shall be inwardly enriched by absorbing the colors and figures of the past and treating the intellectual conditions and transformations of earlier world epochs as a great furtherance of our own intellectual consciousness...It is supremely just and right that all frontiers be swept away (in educating) ourselves to be comprehending human beings, for whom truth and the kinship with things of the spirit is the supreme good...We wish experience to make us, not shrewder (for next time), but wiser (forever).⁹²

Historical knowledge of this nature and with this intention has for its object "anything which can in the remotest way serve our knowledge...(of) the past as a spiritual continuum which forms part of our supreme spiritual heritage." In this light history's task is to collect and preserve history's spiritual gifts in an effort to further the continuum. Thus Burckhardt's high esteem for the Renaissance, as the "uniquely fortuitous case in art history (wherein) the highest beauty and truth of sensuous appearance persistently was striven for and captured as a revelation of the highest spiritual life."⁹³

And it is here that the value of the historian's vocation as collector and preserver is determined by and subordinate to the ends to which artists and philosophers strive. The historian, in furthering the continuum through his work and consciousness, must "reconstruct whole spiritual horizons of the past."⁹⁴

The value of such historical knowledge becomes crucial. Burckhardt's task, he says, is "not so much the study of history as the study of the historical" and knowledge itself comes to be defined as every century's attitude toward the spiritual heritage of the past. It is historical consciousness and the ability to make differentiating comparisons which separates barbarism from culture and which thus becomes culture's right, duty and supreme need.⁹⁵ Further, "any specialized knowledge of the facts possesses in addition to its value as knowledge or thought in a particular field, a universal or historical value, in that it illuminates one phase of the changeful spirit of man, yet placed in the right connection, it testifies at the same time to the continuity and immortality of that spirit."⁹⁶ In turn the object of historical study is further specified. The only point accessible to Burckhardt's study is the "one eternal center of all things: man, suffering, striving, doing as he is and was and ever shall be...In our problematical and wonderful existence we cling involuntarily to the knowledge of man as such, of mankind, empirically, as we meet it in life."

In an enterprise which is "pathological in kind" Burckhardt proposes to leave out "hypothetical primitive conditions" and study only those "pictures of civilizations which are sufficiently and indisputably distinct".⁹⁷ While Burckhardt has condemned the imposition of a priori theorizing upon particulars he has a highly sophisticated manipulation of the "facts" for his higher intellectual end. For the sake of historical consciousness he chooses to emphasize what he sees as the "recurrent, constant and typical" in history. There has been a "sudden devaluation of all mere 'events' in the past" and he "shall therefore retain nothing but the quite indispensable external scaffolding... omitting the refuse of mere facts...in presentation."⁹⁸ "...Long before the dustmen have got their refuse carts moving, and shout disagreeable things after us, we are already over the hills and far away."⁹⁹ Burckhardt will forego historical narration and take up the task of bringing "world history as close to intellectual history as possible." History of civilizations comprises the "spiritually significant content of a period...more easily than can narrative presentation."¹⁰⁰

Contemplating the monuments of the past is the historical mind's way through a life lived in historical flux. The eternal human spirit, aspiring to the ideal beyond flux, has provided indicators and testimonials for the particular man who is torn in his nature between the forces which warp his embodied vision

and his own participation in that eternal spirituality. Where Hegel posits reason and claims to engage in an enterprise which has for its aim reason's empirical demonstration in history, Burckhardt posits the human spirit and claims to offer an empirical encounter with it in history. Burckhardt argues that there is no objective basis for the form, the architecture of reconstruction, the selective presentation, or the outlines of the picture which the historian provides and brings to the data. The Kantian "activity of the mind" is condemned as a *priori* and is thought to be "artificial" in a pejorative sense. This is, in unwitting agreement with Hegel, to "exhibit and expound reality in an unreal way".¹⁰¹ Burckhardt poses passivity and tries to empty himself of activity so that the images presented to his view can be the clearer. These images, offered as Betrachtungen, are to be presented with no claim that the method of presentation exhibits an internal or "objectively existing" relatedness. What, then, is to make possible the grasping of spiritual continuity? Burckhardt denies both that reason itself is the reality of continuity in history and that speculative reason is the activity which grasps the continuity. Instead mind interprets ideally. Here, where Burckhardt offers no systematic theory of knowledge, it is useful to recall the distinctions between reflection and contemplation which had preceded Burckhardt, and to suggest a similarity to Coleridge's

rendering of the issue. Coleridge affirms the possibility of "reflecting aright", that the understanding's reflections are not what Burckhardt has described as "pictures", "constructions", and "mere reflections of ourselves", while at the same time affirming the priority of reason as the faculty of contemplation over understanding as the faculty of reflection.¹⁰² The distinction is an ancient one which seems to have varied a great deal in Western civilization. Theoria, whether it is active in Aristotle's sense or passive in Plotinus' sense, is the intellect's direct contemplation of the intelligible and is productive of knowledge. An ambiguity in regard to activity and passivity is introduced by the complementing doctrine of reflection that the senses convey a mere image, an Eikon of a material object to the mind which passively receives the impression--the noetic product of which, in contrast to the intellect knowing the intelligible, is mere opinion. Coleridge finds himself sympathetic to the Kantian critique of the doctrine of the understanding's passive reception of sensations, yet in at least one case, the case in point for the comparison to Burckhardt, Coleridge's "activity of the mind" is not to be identified with Kant's doctrine of the understanding's active determination of its experience through the use of a priori forms. When Coleridge writes,

O Lady! We receive but what we give,
And in our life does nature live...

he is not expressing a doctrine of the universal and automatic activity of mind which brings determinative and regulative forms to experience but instead is offering the view that the aesthetic transfiguration of the world is dependent upon the activity of a highly individualistic and mutable mind. On the one hand this activity upon which aesthetic experience of the world is dependent functions analogously to the Kantian doctrine of the knower's active determination of experience:

...From the soul itself must issue forth
 A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
 Enveloping the earth--
 And from the soul itself there must be sent
 A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth,
 Of all sweet sounds the life and element!¹⁰³

Yet, on the other hand, this "strong music of the soul" which acts to render an otherwise "inanimate cold world" beautiful is itself dependent upon the subjective states of the viewer, upon joy, and does not operate the way the Kantian mind supposedly does in automatically providing the forms of experience. It is dependent upon mood and the subjective influences which alter the individual's capacity to "make beautiful". It is this kind of activity, contingent by nature, that Burckhardt employs in his comments on the writing of poetry:

Above all, not every feeling, not every mood is fit to be held fast and expressed in poetry; the immediate pain must first be patiently endured before the right mood occurs which is the mother of song...the golden shimmer of reconciliation must already be hovering over things before they can be treated poetically.¹⁰⁴

There is a certain clear similarity between Coleridge's "beautiful and beauty-making power" and Burckhardt's statement of the "power of interpreting things in an ideal sense". For Coleridge this is not a function of the understanding's reception of impressions nor of the application of a priori categories in the constitution of an object. It is an active species of contemplation 1) without which the world is not beautiful, 2) through which the world is rendered beautiful 3) while it itself takes place within the predicament of the individual's apparent bondage to emotion and the elements of the world which supposedly govern the emotions. The fame of this particular poem is of course Coleridge's paradoxical declaration of the "achievement of beauty by the description of the loss of feeling for beauty."¹⁰⁵

Coleridge's carefully-argued distinction between contemplation and reflection does not appear in Burckhardt's language nor in his theoretical statements. His discussions of contemplation in his letters seem to be explaining what Coleridge has defined as reflective operations, i.e., the judgement according to sense. As we have noted, Burckhardt claims he must start with "connections to the external, the concrete, visible nature and history" and asks to be left to experience and feel history on the lower level where the data stream in upon him through the lower level of immediate feeling. He says he starts

out from contemplation, including "spiritual contemplation", an example of which he says is "historical contemplation" which "issues from the impression we receive from the sources." Here Burckhardt uses "immediate" in the sense that feeling is unmediated by the forms of thought. It is pre-reflective in the sense that "Nachdenken", or the understanding's a posteriori manipulation of the data, provides pictures and constructs that are unreal. In this sense there is no "right reflection". Yet it is mediate in the sense that it is dependent upon "impressions received from the sources" as opposed to what Burckhardt sees as Hegel's ungrounded, abstract and pure speculation about history without reference to the data. In this line of thought in which the lower medium is predominant Burckhardt seems to leave the individual with the passive reception of images which evoke something worth expressing, yet which takes place in a process in which the selection, ordering, and combination of the elements of flux remain in the perceiver. This is inconsistent with the "activity of mind" we have identified in Coleridge's and Burckhardt's ideally-interpretive mind. There certainly seems to have been the implication in Burckhardt's statements in the Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen that the spirit is "out there" and present in reality itself, particularly the human spirit which is history's continuity and to which the reader would assume Burckhardt's "spirit of contemplation"

would correspond. The objective ground for Burckhardt's affirmation of the "connection" and "kinship" with past manifestations of the eternal human spirit, which seems to presuppose that the reality of the spirit is given and its "active" contemplation can be validly achieved by the ideally-interpreting mind, still has remained elusive. Burckhardt quotes Plotinus in making his point about the ability of mind to apprehend the ideal. The only conclusion is that Burckhardt remains consistently dualistic by starting with what is concrete and sensual, all of which remains in flux, in an effort to see a spiritual unity and continuity which is not immanent in the manifold but transcends all temporal objects. Presumably his effort is to "forego all that is known by the eyes, turning away forever from the material beauty that once made his joy..." and to train himself to "see" the "utmost brightness" by "remarking all noble pursuits (and) the works of beauty produced by the men known for their goodness..."¹⁰⁶

Thus the continuity, connection, and kinship with the human spirit lies in identity of aspiration: the attempt to glimpse what past men have attempted to express in their poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, and other noble efforts provides the unity. This is notably different from Hegel's framing of the problem of transtemporal continuity. Hegel identifies the kind of history that Burckhardt does as one of four types of reflective history. Reflective or reflecting history on Hegel's

terms is defined over against "original" and "philosophical" history. The distinctions turn on the relationship of the spirit of the historian's time to the spirit of the history he is presenting. In the writing of original history we are presented with no "reflected picture" since the "influences that have formed the writer are identical with those which have moulded the events that constitute the matter of his story". "The author's spirit, and that of the actions he narrates, is one and the same (and) his aim is nothing more than the presentation to posterity of an image of events as clear as that which he himself possessed in virtue of personal observation, or life-like descriptions." This is the same "tethered" historian which Collingwood identifies. Reflective history, however, which Hegel marks off as universal, critical, pragmatic, and the history of ideas as in art history or history of law, is not confined "by the limits of the time to which it relates, but whose spirit transcends the present." Here the problem, which Hegel hopes to solve in his philosophical history, which is manifested in Ranke's disputes with the Hegelians themselves, and which is so difficult for Dilthey and Collingwood, is what Hegel describes as the predicament of the historian approaching his task "with his own spirit; a spirit distinct from that of the element he is to manipulate." Philosophical history seeks to answer the "question of chief importance" which reflective history raises:

"Whether the connection of the whole is exhibited in its truth and reality, or referred to merely external relations". Hegel seeks to reach beyond the limits of the present, which original history and ultimately reflective history are unable to do, while at the same time, in a theory of reason known by reason, a spiritual identity is attained. Both Hegel and Burckhardt describe what they attempt to do using the same language. Hegel says that philosophy escapes from the weary strife of passions that agitate the surface of society into the calm region of contemplation.¹⁰⁷ Hegel contemplates the "idea" in history; Burckhardt sees continuity only in the history of man's reaching for what is forever outside history.

Burckhardt offers no systematic philosophy for how his achievement of continuity through contemplation is possible. He is not concerned with the validity or invalidity of the judgment which established what actually happened and believes that this is clearly possible; only the judgment which assigns moral value or which claims to understand, explain, or find intelligibility in, the fabric of history itself has no theoretical warrant. Dilthey's thinking follows Burckhardt in broad outline. While Burckhardt did not find himself engaged in a struggle between the methodology of the natural sciences and the methodology of the human sciences to the same degree as Dilthey and while he did not articulate his problem as one of

historical relativism as such, his configuration of flux=
contemplation=recurrent, constant and typical corresponds to
Dilthey's anarchy of Weltanschauungen=Verstehen=typology of
Weltanschauungen.

NOTES

1. Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom: Reflections on History, ed., James Hastings Nichols (Boston, 1964), pp. 226-227. This edition is based upon the 1943 English translation of the Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen.
2. Friedrich Meinecke, "Ranke und Burckhardt," Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Heft 27 (Berlin, 1948). Reprinted in Friedrich Meinecke, Werke, VII, Zur Geschichte der Geschichtsschreibung, ed., Eberhardt Kessel (München, 1968), pp. 93-121, pp. 100, 99, 94; quoted and translated in J.L. Herkless, "Meinecke and the Ranke--Burckhardt Problem," History and Theory, IX, 3, 1970, pp. 306, 299, 291.
3. Alexander Dru, sel., ed., tr., The Letters of Jacob Burckhardt (London, 1955), p. 202, p. 97. From letters to von Preen, May 1, 1881 and Hermann Schauenburg, May 5, 1846 respectively. (Hereafter cited as L.B.).
4. L.B., 151, 152. To von Preen, April 26, 1872.
5. cf. Dürr, Oeri, Staehelin, Trog, Wölfflin, and Kaegi, eds., Jakob Burckhardt--Gesamtausgabe (Stuttgart-Basel, 1929 ff.), 14 volumes; Max Burckhardt, ed., Jakob Burckhardt, Briefe (Basel, 1949 ff.), six volumes; R. Meyer-Kraemer, ed., Briefe Jakob Burckhardts an Gottfried und Johanna Kinkel (Basel, 1921); Carl Neumann, ed., Jakob Burckhardt, Briefwechsel mit Heinrich von Geymüller (München, 1914); Emil Strauss, ed., Jakob Burckhardt, Briefe an seinen Freund Friedrich von Preen (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1922); and Julius Schwabe, ed., Jakob Burckhardt: Briefe und Gedichte an die Brüder Schauenburg (Basle, 1923).
6. cf., for example, Alfred von Martin, Burckhardt und Nietzsche, Philosophieren über Geschichte (Krefeld, 1948); von Martin, Nietzsche und Burckhardt; zwei geistige welten im dialog (Basel, 1945); and Edgar Salin, Jakob Burckhardt und Nietzsche (Basel, 1938).
7. Von Martin, Die Religion in Jakob Burckhardts Leben und Denken (München, 1942).

8. cf. Eckhard Heftrich, Hegel und Burckhardt. Zur Krisis des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins (Frankfurt, 1967); Walter Rehm, Jakob Burckhardt und Eichendorff (Freiburg, 1960); Hermann Heimpel, Zwei Historiker: Friedrich Christolph Dahlmann, Jakob Burckhardt (Göttingen, 1962); Reinhard Bendix, "Max Weber and Jacob Burckhardt," American Sociological Review, 30, 176-184, Pedro Moacyr Campos, "Hermann Hesse E A Historia", Revista de Historia, Brazil, 17(36), 289-311; and Hans Joachim Schoeps, Gestalten an der Zeitenwende; Burckhardt, Nietzsche, Kafka (Berlin, 1936).

9. cf. Wallace K. Ferguson's, The Renaissance in Historical Thought: Five Centuries of Interpretation.

10. cf. Edwin Wieser, Jakob Burckhardt, der grosse Schweizer Gelehrte als Prophet (Affolten a.A., 1955); Werner Kaegi, Europäische Horizonte im Denken Jakob Burckhardts; drei Studien; James Hastings Nichols, op. cit., "Burckhardt as Prophet", pp. 30-49; R. Koebner, Zur Begriffsbildung der Kulturgeschichte; Kulturform und Kulturbewegung, Jan Huizinga und Jakob Burckhardt, Historische Zeitschrift, 149, 1, 10-34; Karl Weintraub, Visions of Culture (Chicago, 1966); Richard Däuble, Die Politische Natur Jakob Burckhardts als element seiner Geschichtschreibung (München, 1929); Emil Dürr, Jakob Burckhardt als Politischer Publizist (Zürich, 1937); Valentin Gitermann, Jakob Burckhardt als Politischer Denker (Wiesbaden, 1957); Werner Kaegi, Jakob Burckhardt und sein Jahrhundert (Basel, 1968); Hinrich Knittermeyer, Jakob Burckhardt und Berufung des abendländischen Menschen (Zürich, 1949); Paul Wilhelm Krüger, Das Dekadenzproblem bei Jakob Burckhardt (Basel, 1930); Karl Löwith, Der Mensch in Mitten der Geschichte (Luzern, 1936); Otto Seel, Jakob Burckhardt und die Europäische Krise, (Stuttgart, 1948); Johannes Wenzel, Jakob Burckhardt in der Krise seiner Zeit (Berlin, 1967); and E. Walter Zeeden, "Zeitkritik und Gegenwartsverständnis in Jakob Burckhardts Briefen aus dem Jahren der Reichsgründung", Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein; Festschrift für Hans Rothfels.

11. Benedetto Croce, History As the Story of Liberty, tr., Sylvia Sprigge (Chicago, 1970, p. 104.

12. cf. Berleigh Taylor Wilkins, "Some Notes on Burckhardt," Journal of the History of Ideas, XX(3), p. 127.

13. L.B., p. 60. To Louise Burckhardt, April 5, 1841.

14. L.B., p. 97. To H. Schauenburg, May 5, 1846.

15. Ibid., p. 96. To H. Schauenburg, February 28, 1846.
16. Karl Löwith's title, op. cit.
17. "Historicist" in the sense of Weltanschauung at least.
18. Karl Joel, Jakob Burckhardt als Geschichtsphilosoph (Basle, 1918).
19. Von Martin, Die Religion, op. cit., p. 8.
20. R. Stadelmann, "Jakob Burckhardt und das Mittelalter", Historische Zeitschrift, 142, 3, pp. 473-513; Werner Kaegi, Jakob Burckhardt, Eine Biographie, (Basle, 1950), vol. II, pp. 74-75, vol. III, p. 270; Nichols, op. cit., pp. 10-12.
21. Von Martin describes a picture of Burckhardt's religious personality rather than undertake a biographical study of its development.
22. Kaegi, Jacob Burckhardt, Eine Biographie, op. cit., I, pp. 121-197 (Hereafter cited as J.B.B.).
23. Nichols, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
24. L.B., p. 36. To Johannes Riggensbach, August 28, 1838.
25. Ibid., p. 177. To von Preen, July 7, 1878.
26. Ibid., p. 36. To Joannes Riggensbach, August 28, 1838.
27. J.B.B., I, pp. 387, 388.
28. L.B., p. 33. To Johannes Riggensbach, August 8, 1838.
29. L.B., p. 88, January 14, 1844.
30. L.B., p. 46. To Heinrich Schreiber, September 8, 1839.
31. L.B., p. 88. To Beyschlag, January 14, 1844.
32. Von Martin, Die Religion, op. cit., p. 17.
33. L.B., p. 93. To Gottfried Kinkel, April 18, 1845
34. L.B., p. 70, 71. To Gottfried Kinkel, June 13, 1842.
35. L.B., p. 106, to H. Schauenburg, March 22, 1847.

36. L.B., p. 40. To Johannes Riggenbach, December 12, 1838.
37. L.B., p. 142, To von Preen, July 20, 1870.
38. L.B., p. 48. To von Tschudi, December 1, 1839.
39. L.B., p. 53, 54. To von Tschudi, March 16, 1840.
40. L.B., p. 148. To von Preen, October 12, 1871.
41. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, 1936) 1971 edition, p. 40.
42. Jacob Burckhardt, Judgments on History and Historians (Historische Fragmente), tr., Harry Zohn (Boston, 1958), p. 224. (Hereafter cited as J.H.H.).
43. cf. Fritz Stern, The Varieties of History, "The Ideal of Universal History: Ranke", "A Fragment from the 1830's", (Cleveland, 1956), p. 58.
44. Ibid., p. 59.
45. Ibid., p. 60.
46. Johann Gottfried Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit. Beytrag zu vielen Beyträgen des Jahrhunderts (1774) im Sämtliche Werke, ed., Bernhard Suphan (Berlin, 1877-1913), p. 487, quoted in Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History, (Middletown, 1968), p. 36.
47. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, 1903-1936), IV, p. 50, quoted in Iggers, op. cit., p. 58.
48. Leopold von Ranke, 1831 Lecture "Über die Idee der Universalhistorie," published in Eberhard Kessel, "Rankes Idee der Universalhistorie", Historische Zeitschrift, 178, (1954), p. 295, quoted in Iggers, op. cit., p. 78.
49. From Burckhardt's classnotes "Alte Geschichte, docente Droysen", Jakob Burckhardt Archiv, Staatsarvhiv des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 207, p. 1, quoted in Kaegi, op. cit., II, p. 40.
50. J.B.B., op. cit., p. 74.
51. L.B., p. 65.
52. Ibid., pp. 63, 61. To Eduard Schauenburg, April 15, 1841, and Louise Burckhardt, April 5, 1844.

53. Ibid., p. 50. To Heinrich Schreiber, January 15, 1840.
54. Ibid., p. 71. To Gottfried Kinkel, June 13, 1842.
55. Ibid., p. 72, 73. To Beyschlag, June 14, 1842.
56. Ibid., pp. 73-75. To Karl Fresenius, June 19, 1842.
57. Ibid., p. 71. To Kinkel, June 13, 1842.
58. Ibid., pp. 111, 112. To Paul Heyse, August 15, 1852.
59. J.B.B., op. cit., III, p. 270; II, pp. 74, 75.
60. Ibid., III, p. 270.
61. L.B., p. 122. To Albert Brenner, March 16, 1856.
62. Ibid., p. 117. To Albert Brenner, December 2, 1855.
63. Ibid., p. 109, 110. To Emma Brenner-Kron, May 21, 1852, December 31, 1849.
64. J.B.B., op. cit., III, p. 264.
65. Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom, op. cit., p. 81, 87. (Hereafter cited as F.F.).
66. Ibid., p. 81.
67. Ibid., p. 80.
68. Ibid., pp. 81, 365, 366.
69. Ibid., p. 80, 81.
70. Ibid., p. 80.
71. Ibid., p. 81.
72. L.B., op. cit., p. 147. To von Preen, July 2, 1871.
73. F.F., op. cit., pp. 361, 268, 263.
74. Ibid., p. 79.
75. Ibid., p. 271.
76. J.H.H., op. cit., p. 3.

77. F.F., p. 81, 82.
78. J.H.H., op. cit., pp. 217, 157.
79. F.F., p. 95.
80. Ibid., p. 87.
81. L.B., op. cit., p. 135. To Bernhard Kugler, March 30, 1870.
82. F.F., pp. 88, 89.
83. F.F., pp. 352, 360.
84. J.H.H., p. 162.
85. Ibid., p. 163.
86. F.F., p. 87.
87. J.H.H., p. 162.
88. Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, tr. S.G.C. Middleware, ed. Irene Gordon, (New York, 1960), p. 59.
89. F.F., p. 81; J.H.H., p. 163; F.F., p. 82.
90. Ibid., pp. 83-85.
91. Ibid., pp. 80, 88.
92. Ibid., p. 86; J.H.H., pp. 15, 65; F.F., pp. 89, 86.
93. J.H.H., p. 95.
94. F.F., p. 85.
95. Ibid., pp. 94, 87.
96. Ibid., p. 94.
97. Ibid., pp. 82, 83.
98. L.B., p. 145. To von Preen, December 31, 1870; p. 136, To Bernhard Kugler, March 30, 1870.
99. Ibid., p. 136. To Bernhard Kugler, March 30, 1870.

100. J.H.H., p. 29.
101. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr., J.B. Baillie, (New York, 1967), p. 80.
102. S.T. Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, "On the Difference in Kind of Reason and the Understanding," Selected Poetry and Prose of Coleridge, ed., Donald A. Stauffer (New York, 1951), pp. 536-549.
103. S.T. Coleridge, "Dejection: An Ode", ed., Stauffer, op. cit., p. 29.
104. L.B., p. 110. To Emma Brenner-Kron, May 21, 1852.
105. cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Coleridge and Kant's Two Worlds", A Journal of English Literary History, vii, 1940. Reprinted in The History of Ideas, Lovejoy, (New York, 1948).
106. Plotinus, Enneads, I, vi, pp. 8 and 9.
107. G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr., J. Sibree, (New York, 1966), pp. 2, 4, 457.